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Abstract
What happens to the proposals generated by participatory processes? One of the key 
aspects of research on public participation that has been the subject of rare systematic 
analysis and comparison is the fate of the output from participatory processes: their 
proposals. Which specific factors explain whether proposals are accepted, rejected or 
transformed by public authorities? This paper contributes to this gap in our understanding 
in two steps. First, we identify contextual, process and proposal related factors that are 
likely to affect the prospect of proposals being implemented, generating a set of testable 
hypotheses. Second, we test the explanatory power of these hypotheses through 
multilevel analysis on a diverse set of 571 policy proposals. Our findings offer evidence 
that while there is no effect for contextual factors, both process and proposal related 
variables have significant explanatory power. The design of participatory processes 
affects the degree of implementation, with participatory budgeting and higher quality 
processes being particularly effective. But most significant for explaining implementation 
are proposal level economic and political factors: a proposal's cost, the extent to which it 
challenges existing policy and the degree of support it has within the municipality all 
strongly affect the chance of implementation. 
21. Introduction
Public authorities make extensive use of public participation processes. Many of these 
processes generate large numbers of proposals that recommend particular actions on the 
part of authorities. But we know very little about the extent to which such proposals are 
implemented. This is a significant lacuna in our understanding of the impact of 
participation on public decision making (Nabatchi and Amsler 2014: 81). After all, if 
proposals are ignored and there is no discernible effect on the policies and practices of 
public administrations, then one of the central rationales of a more participatory politics is 
brought into question.
Where evidence exists on the impact of proposals it tends to be from qualitative case 
studies of exemplary participatory processes (e.g. Baiocchi 2005: Warren and Pearse 
2008) or comparisons of the fate of proposals from a small set of fairly homogeneous 
processes (Barrett et al, 2012; Font and Blanco, 2007; Olken, 2010; Progrebinshi and 
Samuels, 2014; Goodin and Dryzek 2005; Kochskämper et al. 2016; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2000). As such it is difficult to generalise to the diverse practice of more mundane 
participatory processes run by public authorities. Where larger scale comparisons exist, 
they tend to be for a single type of participatory process – for example, participatory 
budgeting (Boulding and Wampler 2009). Attempts to provide a more inclusive analysis 
across the field suggest limited and unsystematic effects (Papadopoulos and Warin, 
2007; Mazeaud et al, 2012; Hoppe 2011). For example, in a study from the UK, Lowndes 
and her colleagues discovered that ‘only one-third of local authorities felt that public 
participation had a significant outcome on final decision making’ (Lowndes et al, 2001: 
452).
3Our aim in this paper is to develop a novel insight into the factors that explain variation in 
the fate of proposals across different participatory processes that are organised by or in 
cooperation with local authorities. These local participatory processes, established to 
generate proposals from the public, differ from forms of collaborative governance or co-
production in which participants are directly involved in not only developing proposals, but 
then also implementing them. While elected politicians and local bureaucrats may be 
among the participants in such processes, typically they do not have a decisive voice, 
since these processes are developed to listen to demands ‘from below’. Such processes 
often generate significant numbers of proposals for local authorities to consider. 
Traditional models of participatory governance will often use the term ‘outputs’ (Hoppe 
2011) rather than proposals: we prefer the latter term because it reminds us that these 
are the recommendations put forward by participants. The term ‘fate’ is used rather than 
adopting the more common language of ‘impact’ and ‘outcomes’. In participation research 
outcomes tends to refer to a broader range of effects, such as environmental, economic 
and social outcomes and individual, group and community level outcomes such as social 
learning, trust building and public legitimacy (Bryson et al 2013: 30; Fung 2003; Newig et 
al 2013). This type of research tends to focus on the overall impact of a participatory 
process rather than following how the public authority responds to each proposal 
individually.
Our goal is not to explain the net impact of participation on political decisions or broader 
social outcomes, but to track the fate of participatory proposals themselves. In using the 
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4term ‘fate’, we also recognise that there is not a simple causal relationship between 
proposal (output) and implementation (impact) – other factors may intervene in political 
decision making. Our research question is relatively simple then: Is the differential fate of 
proposals purely random or can it be explained by contextual, process design or 
proposal-related factors? 
We approach this question through the first large-N analysis of proposals generated at 
the local level. This is the level of governance where most participatory processes take 
place and it allows us variation in both location and type of participatory process. Our 
large N approach provides a different set of insights to exisiting case study and 
comparative analysis, enabling us to make generalisations across context, process 
design and types of proposal1.   
We show that context variables have little effect and while some process variables are 
significant, it is proposal level variables that are particularly important to understand the 
fate of proposals. The effect of these variables provides evidence that authorities make a 
non random selection of proposals to be implemented, selecting those that are easier to 
develop or are closer to their own preferences. In other words, local authorities engage in 
‘cherry-picking’ proposals (Smith, 2009: 93) or ‘selective listening’ (Sintomer et al, 2008).
The paper begins with a discussion of how we understand the relationship between 
proposals and implementation, identifying the different potential fates of proposals. This 
allows us to define the dependent variable to be used in our research. Second, we review 
a number of potential explanations of the fate of proposals: factors that may account for 
1 An alternative non-probablistic approach could be the use of fsQCA, although this would require a 
reduction in the number of explanatory variables (Ryan and Smith 2012)
5why some proposals are implemented more extensively than others. Through the 
discussion of these factors we present our independent variables and generate 
hypotheses to be tested. Third, we explain our research strategy and the way in which we 
operationalized the variables across a set of 571 proposals that emerged from local 
participatory processes developed in three Spanish regions. Fourth, we present the 
results of a multilevel analysis conducted to test the significance of the various factors on 
the implementation of proposals. We conclude with a final discussion of these results and 
some of their potential implications. 
2. From proposal to implementation 
Many proposals can emerge from a participatory process. The distinctive characteristic of 
the proposals that we are focusing on is that they are recommendations (or demands) to 
the local authority to take some form of action. Such proposals can be extraordinarily 
diverse, in different aspects such as the degree of specificity of the proposals (from 
paving a section of a road to the promotion of women’s safety at night), their number 
(from one to hundreds resulting from a single process) or the formality of the procedure of 
approval of proposals within the participatory process (from voting and ranking all 
proposals to simply collating all the ideas that have emerged within the minutes of the 
meeting). 
But not all proposals are acted upon by the sponsoring public authority. Explaining the 
different fates of these proposals is our central task and our measure is whether action 
was taken by the authority that corresponds to the recommendation in the proposal. It is 
not enough that the local authority agreed to act. We are interested in whether the 
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6proposal was implemented. For example, we may witness formal acceptance of 
proposals by officials at the end of a participatory process and then no further action. We 
understand such a case as failure to implement.
The dependent variable cannot be simply dichotomous: whether a proposal was 
implemented or not. There is a middle ground between implementation on one side and 
rejection or abandonement of a proposal on the other. An intermediate category captures 
whether or not a proposal was modified by the local authority between the end of the 
participatory process and implementation. We can think of modification in at least two 
ways: the local authority alters the substance of the proposal during the process of 
implementation or only partially implements the proposal. Modified proposals is a highly 
diverse category that includes cases ranging from programs that were established but 
then abandoned; to an infrastructure proposal that was built in a quite different area of the 
municipality; to an activity that was suggested for week-days, but was only implemented 
at week-ends. All cases share the characteristic that some degree of implementation took 
place, but in a way that did not strictly follow the proposed recommendation. For the 
quantitative approach taken in this article, the different types of modification are treated 
as one category2. In the analysis that follows, we thus distinguish between three fates of 
proposals: (1) rejected; (2) partially implemented or modified and; (3) fully implemented3.
2 A more detailed  description of this category appears in ANON (2016) and the role played by technical 
considerations in the explanation of why these changes were introduced is discussed in ANON. The 
potential explanatory role of the way in which technical interventions took place were tested and does not 
change significantly the results shown here.
3 From a democratic perspective, non-implementation and modification may not in themselves be 
problematic: there may be sound reasons as to why a public authority decides not to implement or to alter 
proposals. Providing public explanations (to be analysed in further research) for these decisions becomes 
crucial in these cases.
7In sum, many proposals reach the desk of the local administration, but only a certain 
amount of them are implemented. Is there any logic in this selection process? The next 
section will discuss the factors that can facilitate or diminish the likelihood that a given 
proposal will end up being implemented by the municipality, generating a set of testable 
hypotheses.
3. Potential explanatory factors of differential implementation of proposals
In isolating potential explanatory factors to explain the fate of proposals, we draw on the 
broad literature on participatory governance, including the specific research on the use of 
participatory processes by local authorities. While research on participatory processes 
has grown over recent years, a particular focus on explaining the extent of 
implementation of proposals is relatively rare. Nabatchi and Amsler (2014) argue that 
literature on participatory processes in US local government needs ‘more research on the 
policy outcomes of engagement’ (ibid: 82). Our particular research question is often only 
considered tangentially, if at all.
We distinguish three basic types of explanations: those related to local context, process 
design and individual proposal. This approach has strong affinities with the analytical 
strategies of Newig et al (2013) for undertaking a meta-analysis of literature on cases of 
participatory environmental governance and Nabatchi and Amsler’s (2014) framework for 
exploring variations in direct public engagement at the local level. Newig et al’s approach 
distinguishes between context, process and results, although the category of ‘results’ 
captures broader outputs and outcomes beyond our focus on the fate of individual 
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8proposals. Similarly, Nabatchi and Amsler distinguish between context and setting, 
process design and outcomes, with an additional focus on the motivations of sponsors 
and convenors. Again, their category of outcomes is broader in its ambitions than the 
specific impact of proposals on government action.
Contextual explanations are those where the characteristics of the municipality and public 
authority are the critical factor in explicating implementation of proposals: they provide an 
explanation of the fate of proposals regardless of the particular design of the participatory 
process or the nature of the proposal. Process design explanations place an emphasis on 
the characteristics of the participatory mechanism. While the distinction between context 
and process design is reasonably common in research on participatory governance, our 
study introduces a third level of analysis, proposal level explanations that focus on the 
specific characteristics of each proposal, including factors such as their cost or the degree 
of support within the authority for the proposal. We draw a series of hypotheses from 
each of these three levels.
a. Contextual factors
At the contextual level, much of the explanatory work on participatory governance focuses 
on the legal framework and willingness of public authorities to organise and 
institutionalize participatory processes. For example, there is a strong line of argument, 
particularly focused on participatory budgeting, that Left parties are more likely to 
establish participatory processes (Baiochhi, 2005), although as processes diffuse across 
the world, this ideological underpinning is less obvious (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). But 
9while there may be ideological explanations for the organisation of participation, there is 
no reason to expect such ideological predisposition to the outcomes of a process once it 
is established. The contextual factors that explain the fate of participatory proposals are 
likely to  be different in kind. 
There are three contextual factors that have been related to the response of public 
authorities to proposals from participatory processes: participatory experience, availability 
of resources and the size of the population. The first, participatory experience, suggests 
that where a municipality has invested in developing ‘participation infrastructure’ 
(Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015) it is likely to be more committed to responding to the 
input of citizens. To this end, the number of participatory processes and the existence of a 
municipal public participation plan are taken as proxies for the extent to which a 
participatory tradition is present, generating the following hypotheses:
H1. The number of participatory processes in a municipality increases the rate of 
implementation of proposals.
H2. The presence of a municipal public participation plan increases the rate of 
implementation of proposals
A second municipal-level variable that may explain the difference in the fate of proposals 
is the availability of resources: those authorities with access to resources are more likely 
to be responsive to the demands of citizens. The successful story of Porto Alegre’s 
participatory budget and its distinctiveness from many other cases is often attributed to 
the availability of funding: the city was wealthier than others and the process started with 
a significant tax increase that provided additional resources (Baiocchi, 2005). More 
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recently, Boulding and Wampler (2009) have explained the limited impacts of participatory 
budgeting in many other cities in Brazil by pointing precisely to the lack of funds that 
many of them had available for these programs. This generates the following hypothesis:
H3. The higher income per capita in a municipality, the higher the rate of 
implementation of proposals.
A third municipal-level factor relates to the general claim within democratic theory that 
size of the population matters (Dahl, 1998: 110; Bryan, 2004). Debates about scale are 
far from resolved (Koontz 1999), although there is evidence from European water 
governance that local participation is generally more effective than at higher levels of 
governance (Newig et al 2016: 106). In principle, in a smaller municipality it is easier for 
participants to hold the public authority to account for failure to implement proposals, thus 
leading to the hypothesis:
H4. The smaller the population of a municipality the higher the rate of 
implementation of proposals
b. Process design
One of the most extensive areas of research on participatory processes is the analysis of 
how the design of participatory processes (for example, form of interaction between 
participants; decision making powers; etc.) can be related to outcomes such as social 
justice, mutual learning, democratic skills and capacities and popular mobilization (Bryson 
et al 2013; Fung 2003; Hoppe 2011). Again though, this extensive literature does not 
11
generally speak directly to our specific research question: the ways in which design 
characteristics may impact on the fate of proposals from participatory processes. We can 
discern at least four potential process design factors where there are good reasons to 
expect an effect on implementation: type of participatory process, quality of the process, 
number of proposals and the involvement of other authorities.
Participatory processes vary in the extent to which they are designed explicitly to impact 
on formal decision making processes (Fung, 2006; Smith, 2009). As Baoicchi and 
Ganuza (2014: 36) note, some participatory processes employ an ‘exclusive conveyor 
belt’, with less veto points where proposals can be altered during implementation. This is 
often the case in participatory budgeting which is typically based on the distribution of a 
budget that the authority has already committed to the participatory processes. That said, 
as participatory budgeting has spread from Latin America to Europe, the extent of citizen 
control over budgets has become more ambiguous (Sintomer et al 2015). Compare the 
annual cycle of participatory budgeting with strategic planning processes where 
participants suggest proposals with a much larger time frame and there are generally 
more veto points: for example, proposals are often collated and then screened by policy 
experts after the participatory process has taken place. The type of participatory process 
would thus appear to be an important factor in the fate of proposals. This generates a fifth 
hypothesis:
H5. Participatory budgeting will have a higher rate of implementation of proposals 
than other participatory designs.
12
A second process-level factor that we can reasonably expect to affect the impact of 
proposals is the quality of the process. This is not simply an argument that the outputs of 
a higher quality process are likely to be taken more seriously by officials, but also 
indicates the extent of commitment by the authority to the process. A higher quality 
process requires more investment in terms of time and resources. What makes for a 
higher quality process? Three design elements can be used as proxies for quality. The 
first is the use of facilitation: this indicates a desire to ensure that the variety of voices are 
heard; facilitators typically aim to ameliorate existing power dynamics to encourage those 
who are less politically confident to contribute. Second, the provision of high quality 
information aims at increasing the competence of participants in producing proposals. 
Third, the employment of external consultants is a recognition that the organisation of 
participatory processes requires particular specialist skills. Each element necessitates 
investment of resources by the sponsoring authority. Two of these aspects of quality can 
be seen reasonably as a proxy for more deliberative processes: facilitation and 
information (Smith, 2009). While this is a contested area in the literature with some 
suggestions that deliberation is less goal-directed and thus less likely to produce 
translatable outcomes (Gilman, 2013; Smith et al 2015), we will test the hypothesis:
H6. The higher the quality of the participatory process, the higher the rate of 
implementation of proposals.
There are good reasons to expect that two further characteristics associated with process 
design could be related to the degree of implementation. The first is the involvement of 
other authorities in the process, particularly those from a higher level, such as regional 
administrations. Where other authorities are part of the organisation, horizontal 
13
accountability appears, with external institutional actors able to hold the public authority to 
account for the implementation of proposals (Fung, 2006).
H7. The involvement of other authorities in the delivery of participatory processes 
will increase the rate of implementation of proposals.
The final process-level factor that is likely to have an effect on the fate of proposals is the 
number of proposals that emerge for any given participatory process. While this is not a 
factor discussed in the literature, where a process produces large numbers of proposals it 
is reasonable to assume that it is more challenging for the municipality to respond to them 
all – both in terms of the necessary resources and the complexity of the implementation 
process within authorities – and for participants to hold the authority to account for 
implementation. Equally there is more opportunity to cherry-pick proposals as the number 
of proposals from a participatory process increases. The final process-level hypothesis 
therefore is:
H8. The more proposals generated by a participatory process, the lower the rate of 
implementation of proposals.
c. Proposal related factors
The third set of potentially significant explanatory factors differentiates between the 
characteristics of proposals individually. Much of the research in participatory governance 
neglects the fact that the same process may produce proposals that have quite different 
fates: some are ignored whereas others are (totally or partially) implemented. Which are 
14
the factors that help to explain these different fates of proposals generated in the same 
contexts? 
Proposals sit in a relationship with the existing policy and practices of the public authority. 
It is a reasonable assumption that the willingness to adopt a proposal will be affected by 
the extent to which it conforms with or challenges existing practices. This can be seen as 
a path dependency argument with the weight of the past blocking change (Hoppe 2011: 
178). We see a similar argument made in the ‘goodness of fit’ literature in 
Europeanisation studies: nation states are more likely to implement those European 
regulations and directives that fit with their existing institutional practices (Knill and 
Lenschow 2001). A more critical literature on public participation suggests that processes 
tend to be nothing more than forms of co-option to legitmate current practices (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Fiorino, 1990: 230-31). Following this logic, results of participation are used 
to legitimate support for the existing policies and practices of authorities. Such a sceptical 
perspective does not mean that all proposals will be ignored; rather only those that 
conform with existing practices will be acted upon. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H9. When a proposal challenges existing practices of an administration, it is less 
likely to be implemented.
A different explanatory factor is the presence or absence of support that a particular 
proposal garners. Critics of the goodness of fit hypothesis contend that a better 
explanation of implementation is not its relationship to the status quo but rather the 
preferences or beliefs held by political and administrative actors (Mastenbroek and 
Kaeding 2006). This is thus a different version of the cooption thesis in that it focuses on 
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the alignment of preferences between actors within the local administration rather than 
existing institutional policy and practices: if it is in the interests of key political actors to 
change the practice of the administration, then proposals from participatory processes 
that recommend that direction of change are likely to be supported. As Hoppe argues: 
‘The appearance of open participation… lends additional legitimacy to policies already 
considered, proposed and (almost) decided upon by the elites’ (Hoppe 2011: 180; see 
also Fiorino, 1990). It is the match of a recommendation with the preferences of key 
political and administrative actors that is critical for the fate of proposals. While there are 
always complex rationalities and power constellations within public bodies, the most 
important actors able to influence a proposal’s fate are the governing party and the civil 
servants responsible for implementation of the particular proposal (Ryan and Smith, 
2012). This generates the hypothesis:
H10. Support for the proposal from within the local administration increases the 
likelihood of its implementation.
The final proposal-level factor is the cost implications of fulfilling each proposal: the higher 
the cost to the municipal authority, the greater the impediment for implementation. This 
factor may be mitigated where other sources of funding are available for the 
implementation of a specific proposal, for example from a higher level of government. To 
this end, we need to consider both the cost of proposals and whether external sources of 
funding are available, generating the final two hypotheses:
H11. The lower the cost of a proposal, the higher the likelihood of the 
implementation of a proposal. 
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H12. Availability of external resources increases the likelihood of the 
implementation of a proposal.
4. Research design: from theory to operationalization
This section summarises the research design, data collection and operationalization 
strategy to test these hypotheses. A more extensive explanation of methodological details 
can be found in ANON (2016). 
Research design and process selection
To test these hypotheses, we require variation in three levels: local context, process 
design and proposal. Simultaneously, we need to have a controlled amount of contextual 
variation, since extremely different contexts could create a scenario where alternative 
explanations would be impossible to control. Balancing these two concerns, our choice 
was to select a single polity with a constant legal and administrative framework (Spain) 
and to introduce contextual variation through the selection of diverse municipalities and 
regions. Spain is representative of the Southern European approach to institutional 
participation, in which there is limited supra local pressure to organise participatory 
processes and where ideological motivations for participation (for example, a commitment 
to social justice rather than to efficiency) tend to be more important than in other 
European countries (Font et al, 2014; Talpin, 2011). At the same time, the Spanish case 
was the only one where large and diverse datasets of participatory processes were 
available. We use a quite diverse collection of participatory processes developed in three 
17
Spanish regions with different levels of development and history of participation 
(Andalucía, Catalonia and Madrid). 
We selected a specific time frame, from one local election (2007) to the next (2011), thus 
combining the possibility that there was time enough for at least the initial implementation 
of these proposals (a minimum of three years between the participatory process and the 
fieldwork), but also that memories and administrative records are recent enough to be 
tracked (maximum of seven years between process and fieldwork in 2014). Since our 
goal is to analyse what happens to proposals, we focus only on those participatory 
processes that actually generate proposals (recommendations for action rather than, for 
example, complaints). Thus, the population for our study is participatory processes 
sponsored by municipalities that generate proposals within three Spanish regions during 
the period 2007-20114. 
Our final unit of analysis is proposals. Since we are considering the possibility that 
different proposals emerging from the same participatory process are treated differently, 
we need to follow the evolution of a sample of these proposals to discover whether there 
are factors associated systematically with their differing fate.
A full list of participatory process does not exist. Thus, to construct the sampling frame we 
drew on two existing datasets constructed through web content mining and online surveys 
to municipalities that provided information on 809 participatory processes developed by 
subnational governments in Spain (see ANON 2016). 403 of those processes were 
developed in our temporal frame (2007-2011) and resulted in proposals. We selected 10 
4 In permanent processes we selected proposals from 2010.
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cases from each one of these 3 Spanish regions. We added 10 cases from a second 
Andalusian dataset that captured information on participatory activities of smaller 
municipalities to compensate for the limited presence of these municipalities in the first 
dataset.
To select these 40 cases we adopted a stratified sampling design to ensure 
representation of a diversity of participatory processes and socio-political contexts. The 
strata were created combining 4 variables: region, municipality size, number of previous 
participatory processes and process design. We simplified the diversity of participatory 
process designs into four broad types to create the fourth variable. The first two, 
participatory budgeting and strategic planning (e.g. Agenda 21, education plans, 
economy) are common forms of engagement: the former aims to distribute a given 
budget; the latter contributes to strategic policy development. We then divided the 
remaining processes into other permanent and other temporary processes. These 
permanent processes are mostly citizen advisory councils (e.g., Municipal Health Council 
or Neigbourhood Council), while the temporary processes are, for example, one-off 
participatory consultations or workshops. The final selection of cases in each strata was 
achieved through random selection, resulting in the final selection of cases represented in 
Table 1. The final sample is constituted by 39 rather than 40 cases because for one of the 
cases selected there were no available records5.
Table 1 about here
5 In order to avoid a sample dominated by best practices we adopted a strict substitution policy, resulting in 
only 9 cases excluded due to lack of cooperation. The result was an excellent cooperation rate of 81.3% 
(Total number of cases included in the final sample, 39, divided by the total number of selected eligible 
cases, 48).
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From proposals to variables
In most cases, all the proposals generated by a particular participatory process were 
found in a single document. These documents vary widely in length, structure and detail. 
In a few cases (mostly for strategic plans), proposals were organized under a series of 
common policy areas or objectives. Even in these cases, however, each of the proposals 
could be implemented (or abandoned) independently from the other proposals. For 
example, one of the strategic plans includes the following proposals: complete the 
reconstruction of the historic castle; create a walking trail from the castle; develop a plan 
of equal opportunities for men and women; develop a participatory budget addressed to 
young people; develop a viability plan for the historical center of the municipality; create a 
business incubator to help promote small local companies.
Some processes had over one hundred proposals (mean 53.2). As such it was necessary 
to find a balance between capturing a diversity of proposals from each process to observe 
potential cherry-picking and not to give too much weight to a single process in the final 
sample. With this in mind, we limited the number of proposals for which we collected 
information to 20 per participatory process. The selection of proposals was made through 
systematic random sample6. When the total number of proposals coming out of a single 
process was less than 20, all of them were selected. 
To discover the fate of each selected proposal and collect information on each of the 
independent variables, we accessed a variety of sources. Initial data was drawn from 
6 In most cases, the process documents included a clear list of proposals (or a few of them that could be 
simply added). In a few cases (4 processes) the list of proposals was not fully explicit and was built by two 
coders of the research team and shared with the municipality to verify that our interpretations were correct. 
To select proposals we used systematic sampling, because it respects the structure of the listings of 
proposals, assuring a better representation of the different types of proposals. 
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official documents on the participatory process, some of which were publicly available. 
Further data was gathered through interviews with municipal officers, participants, 
government and opposition politicians and other informants. We also made use of media 
reports and personal blogs of participants.7 We made a total of 162 interviews with an 
average of 4.6 per participatory process. The main goal of the interviews was to clarify the 
final fate of each proposal (i.e, to code the dependent variable) when official documents 
were not available. Some interviews were also useful to clarify characteristics of the 
participatory processes.
The variety of sources as well as their differing quality meant that there were important 
differences in the reliability of information collected (e.g., official records versus subjective 
personal assessments). In order to account for these differences, the data includes a 
reliability filter. This is a dichotomous variable taking the value 0 if there were significant 
contradictions among two crucial informants and 1 if there was no important reason to 
have doubts about the final fate of the proposal. Excluding the non reliable observations 
results in 571 (from the original total of 611) observations, which are the ones considered 
in our analyses.
The dependent variable accounts for both the degree of implementation of a proposal and 
the degree to which it was modified. Implementation means there had to be evidence that 
the local authority had taken action to follow the recommendation8. Decisions on 
7 The codebook is available at ANONYMISED URL. It was tested and improved in a pilot case study. Each 
case was coded by a single coder, and weekly team meetings were used to ensure the use of common 
coding criteria.
8The focus of this paper is on implementation and not decision making by the local authority (see Newig et 
al 2017) because 'decision' proved to be an ambiguous category in the Spanish local context (e.g. what 
counts as a definite decision?) and it was thus difficult to garner reliable information. A more detailed 
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proposals were treated as if they were independent and clearly distinguishable. This is 
fairly realistic in the case of most of the relatively small proposals that emerge from local 
participation processes.
The dependent variable takes three values. Value 0 identifies all the proposals that were 
rejected or where the proposal was never implemented. Value 0.5 identifies the proposals 
that were significantly modified (or only partially implemented). Finally, Value 1 identifies 
all the proposals that were fully implemented without significant changes. Our dependent 
variable is, hence, of ordinal nature, which is taken into account when choosing an 
estimating strategy.
Drawing on the earlier discussion of explanatory factors, we use four variables at each 
level: municipal context, process design and characteristics of proposal. The independent 
variables are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2 about here
The participatory experience of the municipality is captured by two variables. The density 
of participation simply takes the value of the number of participatory processes developed 
in the municipality previous to the period of study.9 The existence of a participatory plan is 
coded as a dichotomous variable (1, yes; 0, no). The size of the municipality is measured 
descriptive, qualitative analysis of the extremely diverse categories of government reaction to proposals, 
short of implementation, will be developed in further research.
9 See supplementary materials for the codings of the variables. Collapsed (ordinal) versions of this variable 
as well as of the number of inhabitants and income per capita were considered in alternative versions of our 
estimations without substantial changes being observed.
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by the number of inhabitants. Finally, we have considered municipalities’ income per 
capita, in euros in 201210. 
The process design variables include the type of participatory process, which 
distinguishes between participatory budgeting (assigned the value 1), strategic planning 
(2), other permanent processes (3) and other temporary processes (4). The quality of 
participation is captured by a four-category index (0-3) where a process scores a point for 
the presence of each of the following three features: facilitator, external experts, high 
quality of information11. The number of proposals per process is a simple numerical value 
from between 1 and 131. The involvement of other supra local administrations takes the 
form of a dichotomous variable (1, yes; 0, no).
Finally, at the proposal level, whether or not the proposal is challenging to existing policy 
and practice12 and the availability of external funding for implementation are captured by 
dichotomous variables, where the value 1 identifies the presence of these features. The 
implementation cost of each proposal is operationalized according to four categories: no 
cost, low cost, intermediate and high cost13. The presence of internal support captures 
10 Two other contextual variables relating to the municipality were analysed because of their role in 
explanations of the establishment of participatory processes: region and the ideology of the governing party. 
Both variables have no significant effects and their inclusion does not change the explanatory power of the 
remaining variables.
11
 The three variables are combined into an index for a number of reasons. First, for the sake of parsimony. 
Second, because there are good theoretical reasons from the literature on deliberative democracy that it is 
the combination of these factors that promotes good quality engagement (Gastil et al 2014; Smith 2009). 
Third, to avoid the risk of multicollinearity. If we split the index, the three variables have coefficients on the 
same direction, but only information reaches statistical significance
12 This variable is generally based on the judgments of our interviewees, except if there was strong 
evidence that they had misunderstood the question. Proposals that represent a break with traditional policy 
or practice in the municipality were considered as “challenging”. For example, among the proposals 
considered challenging there were more substantive ideas (to develop a new local regulation to prevent 
noise pollution) and more symbolic ones (to change the way in which a public protest is organised or 
managed by the local authority following an episode of violence against women).
13 We lack information on this variable for 91 observations. As the type of estimation models we have 
employed is not compatible with multiple imputation, we have performed a classical imputation, predicting 
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support from both politicians in the governing party and from civil servants responsible for 
implementation of the proposal. In both cases we created a four-category variable that 
ranges from “completely disagreed” to “completely agreed”. These were added 
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.7), generating a quite skewed variable potentially overstating the 
agreement of the local actors. Finally, the index was collapsed into two categories, 
distinguishing those observations in which both politicians and civil servants completely 
agreed (77.8%) about the implementation of proposals (value 1) from those where there 
was more ambiguous support or none (value 0). For comparability purposes, all non-
dichotomous independent variables were recoded to range between 0 and 1.
Since our dependent variable was measured at a different level (proposal) than some of 
our explanations (process and municipality level), we estimated the implementation of 
proposals using a series of multilevel regression models for ordinal responses, given the 
ordinal nature of our dependent variable.14 These models allow us to consider dependent 
and independent variables measured at different levels. Although interpretation is not 
always straightforward, multi-level models yield robust coefficients ensuring that the effect 
of all proposal-level and contextual-level variables will not be overstated due to the 
similarities of proposals within a process or a municipality.  
A crucial decision involved choosing between a two-level and a three-level analysis. We 
selected a two-level model for several reasons. First, although the data are undeniably 
arranged in three levels (proposals, processes, municipalities) they are not perfectly 
the missing values of the variable “cost of the proposal” using 11 municipality characteristics and 13 
variables that characterize the participatory processes. The results do not change if we run the models 
losing these 91 cases instead of using imputation.
14 More specifically, we have employed the meologit STATA (13) command. The integration method used 
for the random-effects model (mvaghermite) performs mean and variance adaptive Gauss–Hermite 
quadrature.
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pyramidal. Put in other words, our data do not comply with the rule of thumb regarding the 
minimum, safe number of units at each level of the analyses, which should ideally be 30 
or higher (Maas and Hox, 2005). Instead of having 30 times more proposals than 
processes and 30 times more processes than municipalities, we have 25 municipalities, 
39 participatory processes and over 550 proposals. The aforementioned rule of thumb is 
violated when considering processes nested within municipalities. Finally, a likelihood 
ratio test comparing identical models with two or three levels yielded no significant 
differences, suggesting that specifying a third level was not necessary. As a result, we 
have considered two levels. The first is the level at which the observations are measured, 
that is, the proposal level. The second, the ‘contextual’ level, includes characteristics of 
both processes and municipalities, although we have clustered first level observations 
using process identifiers. What this means is that municipal phenomena are regarded as 
aspects of process characteristics15.
5. Results
We begin with a preliminary look at our dependent variable, tracking the fate of the 571 
proposals. This is followed by the development and discussion of the multilevel model.
The fact that most participatory processes generate a significant number of proposals 
offers plausibility to the idea that some are cherry-picked. A preliminary search of the 
15 For instance, in order to explain the fate of a proposal A that emerged from Process B, we analyse the 
characteristics of the proposal itself (e.g. Was this a “challenging” proposal?), the process from which the 
proposal was generated (e.g. Were the participants well informed about the alternatives?) and the 
municipality in which the process was organised (e.g. Was it a small town?). In our model, the latter 
municipality characteristics are attributable to the process (e.g. a well informed process held in a small 
town). 
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original population of the 249 participatory processes captured through internet search 
showed that a  large majority of the processes that generated implementable proposals 
had more than 25 proposals, with some processes producing more than 100 proposals. 
The scope for cherry-picking is also clear in the most preliminary look at the fate of 
proposals: 32 of the 39 processes fully implemented some of them; only three processes 
implemented none of them; and only four implemented all of them.
Figure 1, based only on the sampled cases, summarizes the fate of proposals from 
participatory processes. Cherry-picking exists, with local authorities responsive to some of 
the outputs of participatory processes. Our set of proposals is divided in three groups 
similar in size: implemented (35 percent), partially implemented and rejected (both close 
to 31 percent).  
                Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 presents the results of a  multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression that 
takes into account all the independent variables considered above. The graph gives us a 
visual impression of the impact of each predictor along with its significance, at 95 percent 
Confidence Intervals (value zero signals non-significant effects). It illustrates the strength 
of proposal-level variables: internal support for the proposal is the strongest predictor of 
implementation, followed by the existence of external funding. In the opposite direction, 
costly and challenging proposals are more often abandoned or substantially modified than 
implemented .
Figure 2 about here
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The figure also confirms that aspects of process design affect the extent to which 
proposals are implemented: proposals stemming from high quality participation processes 
as well as those coming from participatory budgeting having more positive prospects16. 
Finally, no significant impact of municipal variables is observed.17
In order to clarify the impact of each of these variables, Table 3 displays the predicted 
probabilities for each category of the dependent variable and for each independent 
variable with a significant effect on the fate of proposals. For example, while non-
challenging proposals have a 24 percent chance of being rejected, challenging ones are 
almost twice as likely to be rejected. Conversely, non-challenging proposals have a 42 
percent chance of being fully implemented, and challenging ones only 26 percent. A 
similar effect is observed for the cost of proposals. The difference between the chance of 
rejection of low and high cost proposals is about 20 percent. Similarly, there is 15 percent 
more chance of proposals being rejected when external funding is not available compared 
to those with external funding. When both public servants and politicians in a local council 
give their support to a proposal, its likelihood of being rejected is 30 percentage points 
less than when one or both of these actors fails to offer support: a supportive authority 
16 To confirm that participatory budgeting did not have an overwhelming effect on the overall result given its 
particular characteristics, we reproduced the analysis excluding these cases. The results do not suffer any 
major change, with only two process characteristics (number of proposals and other administrations 
participating) now achieving significant results.
17 Table 4 in the Appendix displays the multilevel estimations in detail, from the null model to the full model 
presented in Figure 2. The table confirms that introducing the municipal variables pairwise does not change 
the fact that their effect is not significant. However, these models also show that the size and wealth of the 
municipality probably have more explanatory power than the variables related to the municipality’s 
participatory experience (lower estimated variance of the random intercepts). The lowest values of the AIC 
(Akaike Information Criterion) and the BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) suggest that the second or third 
model (respectively) are probably the best in predicting the phenomenon under study  This suggests again 
that the inclusion of municipal variables does not add to the explanation provided by the characteristics of 
the proposals and the process design.
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implies a 46 percent chance of being fully implemented, while a proposal lacking support 
from politicians and public servants have only a 17 percent chance of full implementation.
Table 3 about here
Turning to variables associated with the participatory processes from which proposals 
stem, processes characterized by all three quality criteria are almost 20 percentage points 
less likely to be rejected than those with none of these characteristics. The effect is 
similar for full implementation, with proposals from high quality processes having a 45 
percent chance of being fully implemented. Finally, proposals from participatory budgeting 
are 17 percentage points less likely to be rejected than those from other types of 
participatory process. They have a 51 percent chance of being fully implemented, while 
proposals from other types of process are only implemented 30 percent of the time18.
6. Discussion
There is a suspicion within both academic and practitioner communities that public 
authorities cherry-pick proposals from participatory processes (Sintomer et al, 2008; 
Smith, 2009). If this is the case, then it may undermine significantly the democratic value 
of public participation. But the degree to which this selective listening on the part of public 
18 Correlations among these variables (available upon request) are not remarkably high, with only 4 out of 
75 being over 0.3. Only cost and external funding (0.46) have correlations above 0.4. Our goal here is not to 
test how process design affects the content of proposals. While we cannot rule out that process 
characteristics have a larger influence through effects on the kind of outputs they produce, the relatively 
small correlation that exists among these variables (e.g, 0.06 between quality processes and internal 
support) suggests this additional effect would be limited.
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authorities actually happens is the object of scant systematic attention, especially if we 
move beyond individual case studies or research focusing on a single type of participatory 
process or specific set of policies19. 
Our paper contributes to filling this gap through the empirical analysis of the fate of nearly 
600 proposals emerging from 39 different participatory processes. The scope for 
politicians to cherry-pick certainly exists, as most of the processes end with a substantial 
list of proposals. However, the extent of discretion and selective listening is limited, with 
two-thirds of proposals being implemented, more than half of which without significant 
modification. It is possible that our results may be overstating the level of government 
compliance with proposals through two different mechanisms. First, there are some 
extremely poorly designed and organised processes that are not documented and so 
were not visible when the datasets were constructed. As a result, we are likely to have 
undersampled this set of least successful processes20. Second, the important role of local 
authority personnel as informants may have also biased the results in a positive direction, 
even if we always triangulated their reports with the perspectives of other local 
informants, excluding the case if they were too different. These caveats aside, we believe 
that this result is not simply a product of methodological challenges, but may well relate to 
the relatively limited nature of many of the proposals: small projects and ideas that can be 
implemented without facing a tremendous economic or political challenge. Local 
administrations can afford to be participatory and listen when they face demands that 
require few resources and are politically unchallenging. In other words, would these 
19 For environmental policies see for example Drakiewicz et al (2015). Their comprehensive approach also 
uses a research strategy that avoids the selection bias problem that exists in most previous research.
20 Our decision not to include in our population processes without proposals also has an effect of excluding 
least successful processes. Even if they are not be expected to have consequences on local authority 
policy and practice, their existence contributes to the image of non-consequential participatory processes.
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results hold for a different set of ‘harder’ decisions on more controversial issues 
(Carmines and Stimson, 1980)? To a certain extent, we have an answer to this question, 
since our model already predicts that a population with a larger proportion of challenging 
proposals would result in more limited compliance by authorities.
When we turn to the factors that explain the extent of implementation, it is striking that 
none of the contextual polity factors analysed have an impact on the fate of proposals: 
our first four hypotheses are not confirmed. Not only do none of these factors reach 
statistical significance, but their overall contribution to the explanatory power of the model 
is almost null. It is important to recall here the different nature of our analysis and its 
dependent variable compared to most of the literature on participatory processes: 
contextual factors matter for the original organisation and successful development of 
participatory processes, but none of them contributes to explain the fate of proposals. 
Clearly, our analysis does not prove that municipal context is immaterial: a sample 
including larger local diversity could achieve different results. But our null findings for the 
first four hypotheses point in the interesting direction that factors closer to the proposal 
are overtly more relevant than those related to the local context21.
Evidence of cherry-picking does emerge when we turn to the analysis of process and 
proposal level factors. Democratic theorists have made a strong case that design matters 
in judging the democratic character and effectiveness of participatory processes (Fung, 
2006; Smith, 2009). Our data bears this out. The type of participatory design is 
particularly important and H5, which posited that participatory budgeting is more effective 
21 Newig et al (2017) also show that most contextual variables do not have an effect. Only one variable 
specific to environmental policies (Nimby situation) is significant in their analysis.
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in realising proposals than other forms of participatory process, is confirmed. Participatory 
budgeting has at least two implementation advantages. The first is it generally operates 
within the confines of a specific budget that is designated for the purpose of distribution 
by participants: local authorities have accepted that these funds should be put at the 
discretion of local people and so are more likely to follow their decisions. Second, the 
design of participatory budgeting often includes institutionalised citizen oversight: selected 
participants have a role in overseeing the implementation process by local government. 
Arguably officials are less likely to cherry-pick proposals when they are being watched. 
Compare this arrangement with strategic planning processes. Often these involve a 
number of different participatory channels that each generate their own lists of 
recommendations, with more public authority veto points – opportunities for discretion in 
which proposals to take forward. In addition, some of these exercises work on a longer 
time frame: proposals are not to be implemented over the next year, but over a longer 
time span. It may be the case that if we undertook follow-up research 10 years later, the 
rate of completion of strategic planning proposals would increase and become closer to 
that other participatory exercises22. Future research will be needed to confirm these 
interpretations and fully explore the causal mechanisms that produce differential 
implementation rates across different designs.
A second process design variable that exhibits significance in effecting the rate of 
implementation of proposals is the quality of participation, thus confirming H6. This affirms 
the expectation that where authorities have invested resources to ensure a high quality 
22 Most proposals do not include a specific time frame for their implementation. However, most are modest 
and could be developed in the time span of the analysis. Only a few proposals (mostly from strategic 
planning and other temporary processes) may need a few more years for full implementation.
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process – through the use of facilitators, consultants and information – then they are more 
likely to attend to the recommendations that emerge. The causal mechanism would follow 
a logic of path dependency: a commitment to invest in a participatory setting is 
constitutive of a commitment to respond positively to its proposals. These factors are also 
reasonable indicators for the deliberative capacity of a process, offering a tentative finding 
that deliberation may be related to implementation. This contrasts with earlier suggestions 
that posit a trade-off between deliberation and political impact (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; 
Smith et al, 2015), suggesting the need for future research on the real existence of this 
trade-off and its causal mechanisms. The other two process-level hypotheses (H7 and 
H8) that capture the role of other authorities and the number of proposals a process 
generates are not proved fully, even if both of them have a coefficient in the direction 
expected.
The strongest explanatory power of our variables rests with proposal-level explanations, 
with all four hypothesis (H9 to H12) being confirmed: our results suggest that local 
authorities are more likely to implement proposals that have strong internal support from 
both the governing party and civil servants, are less costly, bring additional funding from 
other authorities and do not challenge the administrations’ current practices. The public 
tends to get its way if its recommendations correspond to the preferences or the existing 
practices of the administation – and do not put pressure on the budget (either through low 
cost or additional finance). From a rational choice perspective this is simple logic and it 
tends to support the cooption thesis that authorities will only act on proposals that either 
correspond to the preferences of key political and administrative actors or with existing 
practices of the administration.
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From a democratic perspective this is a far from compelling finding. While local 
administrations do implement some proposals that run against their expressed interests 
(17 percent of probabilities, Table 3), they clearly listen selectively to inexpensive 
demands that reinforce their preferences and existing ways of working. Many of the 
successful proposals would likely have been implemented even if the participatory 
demand had not existed (Hoppe 2011). The dynamics of cherry-picking proposals are 
clear.
Future data collection processes that introduce larger contextual diversity (including 
results in other countries and economic contexts23) would be needed to confirm whether 
the same levels of implementation are found and whether the factors affecting the fate of 
proposals in different environments are similar. Comparative research has pointed to the 
Spanish participatory context as bearing strong resemblances to the rest of Southern 
Europe (Talpin, 2011), but differences with the Anglo-American and Scandinavian 
traditions may be larger (Alarcón and Font, 2014) and cross-national comparison would 
show whether national-level characteristics come into play. Other relevant policy effects 
could exist, for example through agenda-setting processes. Alternative research designs 
that further differentiate stages in the policy cycle (e.g., decision versus implementation), 
explore the diversity of forms of partial implementation or capture additional chractaristics 
of proposals (e.g., their policy relevance) could also yield further insights. Given the 
demanding resource implications of collecting data on proposals across multiple contexts 
and processes, a meta-analysis of the numerous existing studies of participatory 
23 A specific analysis of how the context of economic crisis has affected the fate of proposals shows small 
(but significant) differences due to the crisis context (ANON). The analysis of the pre-crisis processes 
confirms the same cherry picking dynamics isolated here.
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processes or cases on platforms such as Participedia would appear to be an attractive 
propostion. However, this is not possible because such studies and cases rarely provide 
an analysis of the fate of all of the proposals that are generated by a particular process.
Our findings have important implications. The systematic empirical assessment of the 
degree of implementation of a diverse set of proposals questions both the commonly held 
impression that proposals from participatory processes tend to be ignored by public 
administrations, as well as very positive results based on a few exemplary processes 
displaying strong democratic qualities (e.g. Smith 2009). This evidence needs to be 
tempered, however, with our second broad finding: even if substantial implementation of 
proposals prevails, cherry-picking exists and it tends to follow a quite rational pattern, 
reinforcing the existing power of local authorities. This finding should inform our 
assessments of the potential and pitfalls of local participatory processes.
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Table 1. Accomplished sample composition




Nº of participatory processes
 in the municipality
Three or more 24 61.5% 16.6
Less than three 13 33.3% 14.8
No info 2 5.2% 10.5
Process design
Participatory budget 8 20.5% 19.7
Strategic planning 14 35.9% 19.2
Other permanent 8 20.5% 11
Other temporary 9 23.1% 10.7
Municipality size
Less than 10,000 
inh.
11 28.2% 16.2
10,000 to 50,000 
inh.
12 30.8% 15.7
More than 50,000 inh. 16 41.0% 15.3
Region
Andalusia 19 48.7% 15.8
Catalonia 10 25.6% 18.8
Madrid 10 25.6% 12.3
Source: own elaboration
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Table 2. The explanatory factors of proposals’ success
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challenging











0 (no), 1 (yes) 0.34
(0.474)
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0 (none or only one of politicians 
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(strategic planning); 3 (other 
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s











Not challenging .24 .33 .42Challenging character Challenging .40 .34 .26
Low .21 .30 .49Cost High .44 .32 .24
No .36 .33 .31External funding Yes .21 .31 .49
None or only one support .50 .33 .17Internal support of politicians 
and public servants Both support .20 .34 .46
0 criteria .44 .32 .24Quality of participation index 3 criteria .23 .31 .45
Participatory budgeting .19 .30 .51Participatory budgeting Other .36 .34 .30
N = 540
Figure 1. Distribution of fate of proposals
N = 571 (2.8% are missing values)
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Table 4. Multilevel estimation of the implementation of proposals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Characteristics of the proposals
Challenging character -.921*** -.894*** -.897*** -.887*** -.896***
(.195) (.195) (.194) (.195) (.195)
Cost -1.328*** -1.424*** -1.505*** -1.403*** -1.474***
(.326) (.328) (.334) (.330) (.335)
External funding .867*** .915*** .976*** .925*** .987***
(.231) (.230) (.233) (.231) (.234)
Internal support 1.608*** 1.618*** 1.610*** 1.624*** 1.625***
(.212) (.211) (.211) (.212) (.211)
Characteristics of the participatory process
Quality of participation index 1.039* 1.271* 1.014~ 1.221*
(.519) (.521) (.522) (.519)
Type of process: participatory budgeting .823* .963** .908** 1.087**
(.331) (.334) (.348) (.360)
Type of process: other permanent mechanism .554 .636 .603 .694
(.463) (.450) (.464) (.452)
Type of process: other temporary experiences .620 .534 .691~ .621
(.403) (.397) (.411) (.411)
Number of proposals per process -.768 -.919~ -.773 -.929~
(.521) (.517) (.521) (.517)
Other administrations involved -.503~ -.356 -.480~ -.331
(.280) (.280) (.280) (.279)
Municipal context
Magnitude (Inhabitants) 1.224 1.247
(.868) (.915)
Income per capita -.623 -.740
(.550) (.560)
Municipal density of participation -.184 -.322
(.393) (.384)
Participation plan .199 .182
(.283) (.288)
N 555 540 540 540 540 540
N2 39 39 39 39 39 39
-2LL -580.817 -508.594 -500.710 -499.445 -500.430 -499.005
df 4 1 12 12 14
AIC 1167.635 1031.187 1027.420 1028.890 103.860 1032.009
BIC 1180.591 1061.228 1083.211 1093.263 1095.234 1104.966
Standard errors in parentheses. Method: Maximum Likelihood.  ~ p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Constants omitted. All non-dichomous variables are standardized so as to range between 0 and 1.
N (first-level number of observations), N2 (second –level number of observations), Deviance ( -2 log likelihood), df 
(degrees of freedom), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), BIC (Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion).
Reference category for “Type” of process: strategic planning
